by
Damien F. Mackey
“While many Egyptologists have been reluctant to allow Ramesses III
any military action in western Asia north of Sinai, archaeologists were identifying a phase at the transition from the Bronze to Iron Age in Palestine as a period
of “Egyptian empire”—largely under the early 20th Dynasty”.
Peter James
That Ramses II ‘the Great’, and Ramses so-called III, need to be identified as being just the one mighty pharaoh, I have argued in articles such as:
The Complete Ramses II
(3) The Complete Ramses II | Damien Mackey - Academia.edu
Ramses II, Ramses III
(3) Ramses II, Ramses III | Damien Mackey - Academia.edu
and:
Can the long-reigning pharaoh, Ramses II, possibly be fitted into a tightening revision?
(3) Can the long-reigning pharaoh, Ramses II, possibly be fitted into a tightening revision? | Damien Mackey - Academia.edu
Now, information provided by Peter James in his scholarly article for Antiguo Oriente, volumen 15, 2017:
THE LEVANTINE WAR-RECORDS OF RAMESSES III: CHANGING ATTITUDES, PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE* PETER JAMES
https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/bitstream/123456789/7248/4/the-levantine-war-records.pdf
only serves to reinforce me in my view that, to minimalise Ramses III, as one merely aspiring to - but by no means succeeding in – emulate (ing) Ramses II, does a great disservice with regard to the stupendous achievements of Ramses III.
Beginning on p. 65 (through to p. 73), Peter James will write about the minimalising assessments of the career of Ramses III:
….
“MINIMALIST” VIEWS OF RAMESSES III’S CLAIMS
Returning to trends in attitudes towards Ramesses III’s campaigns, in 1906 Breasted was prepared to see both land and sea battles with the “Sea Peoples” as having taken place near the coast south of Arvad (northern Phoenicia). …. British Egyptologist Henry Hall was far more cautious, placing the land and sea battles with the Sea Peoples close to the frontier of Egypt itself; he did allow, however, that Ramesses III later marched to Amurru to restore Egyptian authority there, although not as far as the Euphrates. ….
In Hall’s understanding the place names from the Euphrates region in Ramesses III’s toponym lists (such as Carchemish) were “due probably to a very bad habit begun in his reign, that of copying the names of cities captured in the wars of Thothmes III...”
Mackey’s comment: Ramses III was copying no previous pharaoh.
His records are likely genuine accounts - allowing for some degree of pharaonic embellishment - of his own achievements.
Attitudes against the reality of Ramesses III’s claimed campaigns continued to harden in the mid-to-late 20th century. By then it was becoming the received wisdom that Ramesses III did not campaign as far as northern Phoenicia. This view was symptomatic of a more general one regarding the originality of his war records, which casually dismissed them often in toto as copies from the records of the “great” Ramesses. Of the Medinet Habu war records Faulkner wrote that “the inscriptions contain but a halfpenny-worth of historical fact to an intolerable deal of adulation of the pharaoh ...”
Regarding the Nubian battle scenes, the magisterial Alan Gardiner felt that they “seem likely to be mere convention borrowed from earlier representations.” …. Likewise Faulkner: “...the scenes of a Nubian war at Medinet Habu are surely only conventional with no historical reality behind them.” ….
Gardiner dismissed a Syrian campaign entirely. …. Faulkner was only slightly more generous: “...the scenes in question are anachronisms copied from a building of Ramesses II. Yet there may be a substratum of historical fact beneath them...” ….
Mackey’s comment: If Ramses III were II, as I am claiming, then there was involved no “copying” whatsoever.
Surprisingly, after his generally scathing remarks, Faulkner allowed that Ramesses III “may have attempted to follow up his success [defeating the “Peoples of the Sea”] by “pushing on into Syria to drive the enemy farther away from Egypt...”
Mackey’s comment: Now it’s a two bob each way bet.
George Hughes stressed “the fact that Ramses III patterned his mortuary temple after that of Ramses II, but on a smaller scale.” …. Nims listed the many comparisons he observed between the two buildings, from the general arrangement to specific details of iconography and text:
The evidence of the copying of the Ramesseum reliefs by the scribes who planned the reliefs in Medinet Habu shows that a large number of the ritual scenes in the latter temple had their origin in the scenes in the former and occupied the same relative positions in both temples. ….
Mackey’s comment: Same pharaoh, probably same architects and same scribes.
Most of the similarities concern cult and religious scenes per se, though with some differences with respect to the placement of military scenes:
Ramses III used the rear face of the first pylon of Medinet Habu for accounts of his military exploits, just as Ramses II used the equivalent space at the Ramesseum for his. The long account of Year 8 of Ramses III was carved on the front face of the north tower of the second pylon at Medinet Habu; the parallel wall at the Ramesseum seems to have been occupied by the famous battle poem of Ramses II. The rear face of this pylon at the Ramesseum, on the other hand, shows battle reliefs below scenes of the Min Feast, as does the lower register of the east wall of the first hypostyle hall south of the axial doorway, while in Medinet Habu the corresponding walls have religious scenes. ….
Mackey’s comment: Same pharaoh, probably same architects and same scribes.
Building on the observations of Nims, Lesko took the extreme position that all of Ramesses III’s war records at his mortuary temple of Medinet Habu and elsewhere, were copied from the work of predecessors—with the exception of his second Libyan campaign, dated to Year 11. …. In Lesko’s view, even the famous records of the “Sea Peoples” battles were borrowed from the nearby (and now-destroyed) mortuary temple of Merenptah.
A major factor in the dismissal of Ramesses III’s northern campaigns has been the assumption that the Medinet Habu reliefs show his troops storming two Hittite towns (see above). Indeed, the inhabitants of the two towns look Hittite in appearance. One is labelled “Tunip,” while the name of the second has been frequently read as “Arzawa.” As the location of the Hittite vassal kingdom of Arzawa in western Anatolia (on the Aegean seaboard) is certain … the idea that Ramesses III would have been able to campaign this far, Sesostris-like, strikes as absurd.
Mackey’s comment: The location of Arzawa if far from “certain”.
I have grappled with it in my recent article:
More uncertain ancient geography: locations Tarḫuntašša and Arzawa
(2) More uncertain ancient geography: locations Tarḫuntašša and Arzawa | Damien Mackey - Academia.edu
“Arzawa …. The exact location is unknown …”.
“Arzawa … a poorly-recorded state with uncertain borders …”.
Peter James continues:
Gardiner flatly stated that:
All these pictures are clearly anachronisms and must have been copied from originals of the reign of Ramessēs II: there is ample evidence that the designers of Medinet Habu borrowed greatly from the neighbouring Ramesseum. Confirmation is given in the papyrus [Harris I] cited above; this has no mention of a Syrian campaign, still less of one against the Hittites.
All that is said is that Ramessēs III “destroyed the Seirites in the tribes of the Shōsu”; the Shōsu have already been mentioned as the Beduins of the desert bordering the south of Palestine, and ‘the mountain of Se‘īr’ named on an obelisk of Ramessēs II is the Edomite mountain referred to in several passages of the Old Testament. It looks as though the defeat of these relatively unimportant tent-dwellers was the utmost which Ramessēs III could achieve after his struggle with the Mediterranean hordes....
With these words, a nadir was reached in the assessment of Ramesses III’s military activities. It still prevailed forty years later when Kenneth Kitchen wrote:
There is no evidence that he invaded Palestine in Year 12 (a rhetorical text of that date itself proves nothing). The Medinet Habu Syrian war-reliefs are most likely merely copies from those of Ramesses II, as they include entities no longer extant for Ramesses III to battle against. Ramesses III attacked not Israel, but Edom in south Transjordan, as the factual descriptions in Papyrus Harris I make clear. ….
By the “entities” which Kitchen described as “no longer extant for Ramesses III to battle against,” he meant various Anatolian states such as Hatti and Arzawa which were allegedly swept away by the “Sea Peoples” invasion of Ramesses III’s Year 8. …. Otherwise it is clear that in 1991 Kitchen, like Gardiner, was arguing that Ramesses III did not campaign any further than the Sinai/Negev area—as no campaigns further north are mentioned in the “factual descriptions” from Papyrus Harris. More recently Strobel went even beyond Gardiner, Kitchen, Lesko and others, writing what can only be described as a tirade against Ramesses III. For reasons of space only a few quotes follow:
Ramses III started his triumphal report on the walls of the temple in Medinet Habu, which was finished in his year 12, with his “Nubian War.” However, this war never happened. The same is true for the “Asiatic or Syrian War”, the last of the reported military deeds. Ramses’ ideological invention of these wars should bring his deeds on the same level as the triumphs of Ramses II and Merenptah, especially Merenptah’s Asiatic war. The texts and reliefs of Ramses III are no “war journal” or realistic picture of his military campaigns, but a triumphal self-representation on a highly ideological degree. The texts are first of all rhetorical and formulaic; the events are presented and described in a fixed ideological scheme and language...Ramses III was a “plagiarizer and self-aggrandizer of the first order.” He ordered direct copies from the records and illustrations of the Ramesseum and without doubt, from the today destroyed funerary temple of Merenptah in his direct neighbourhood. He even took a quite important amount of blocks, recuts and not recuts, by quarrying other temples, especially those of his predecessors. ….
Were we to take all the negative opinions together, Ramesses III’s military efforts would have been confined to repelling Libyan invaders in his year 11 and a minor raid against “bedouin” in the Sinai area.
Such a picture seems unrealistic, to say the least. Ramesses III’s records talk of tribute from northern lands, the supply of his temples by goods and tribute from foreign lands (notably Djahi and Kharu), and the revenues drawn from temples maintained in the empire, including the construction of a new one in “Canaan.” …. Ramesses III ruled Egypt for 31 years in relative security and prosperity, with tribute drawn from Levantine domains. One wonders how this feat was achieved, in economic terms, if the Egyptian army was so idle, only fighting defensive wars and never active beyond the frontiers—with the exception of an allegedly trivial foray against the Shasu of Edom. Such a picture goes totally against the grain of what we know of New Kingdom dominion and economics. It has also long run counter to the archaeological evidence from the Levant.
THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL EVIDENCE
In the days of Sayce (see above) the Amarna and Boghazköy archives were the “smoking guns” proving the reality of the campaigns of Thutmose III and Ramesses II. Was there an equivalent for Ramesses III? No, but what Ramesses III lacked in terms of new literary documents was amply recompensed in terms of archaeological finds—from small finds such as numerous scarabs … a statue fragment from Byblos … the “pen-case” of an of an officer at Megiddo … to the plethora of discoveries at Beth-Shean, beginning in 1923 with a seated life-size statue outside the “northern temple” to inscriptions from its doorways and jambs, and the “pen-case” of another local official. …. Most of these finds had been made by the mid-20th century, such as the Megiddo pencase in 1937. Taken together they should have had an impact on views about the reality of his Levantine expeditions further north than the Sinai region (where inscriptions are known from the mining centre of Timna, etc.).
So how did Egyptology react to such finds?
An interesting dichotomy arose. …. While many Egyptologists have been reluctant to allow Ramesses III any military action in western Asia north of Sinai, archaeologists were identifying a phase at the transition from the Bronze to Iron Age in Palestine as a period of “Egyptian empire”—largely under the early 20th Dynasty. Evidence for this comes most clearly from southern sites like Tell esh Shari‘a, Tell el Far‘ah (south), Gaza and Deir el-Balah and, to the north, Megiddo and Beth-Shean in the Jezreel Valley. ….At the latter, pottery and other evidence suggest an increased Egyptian presence during the early 20th Dynasty. …. It is clear that his successor Ramesses IV maintained a presence at Beth-Shean … 51 though it seems that he was the last pharaoh to hold sway so far north. ….
With respect to the reality of Ramesses III’s campaigns, the arch-minimalist Lesko noted: “Archaeological evidence should help to resolve these problems.”53 But he restricted his comments here to an alleged destruction of Beth Shean by Ramesses III (for which there is not a shred of evidence), mentioning but failing to appreciate the significance of an inscription of his Chief Steward from that site, i.e. the power of Ramesses III reached as far as the Jezreel Valley. The idea that Ramesses III’s campaigning in Palestine was limited to Edom overlooks the archaeological evidence. Other mid-to-late 20th century Egyptologists, such as Wilson, appreciated more fully the importance of the archaeological finds:
Ramses III still held his Asiatic empire in Palestine. His statue has been found at Beth Shan and there is record of him at Megiddo. He built a temple for Amon in Palestine, and the gods owned nine towns in that country, as his duepaying properties. The Egyptian frontier was in Djahi, somewhere along the coast of southern Phoenicia or northern Palestine. ….
Wilson allowed Ramesses III’s empire a fairly generous reach, but the implication is that he merely “held” it as an inheritance from his 19th dynasty predecessors (see below) without any active campaigning. Likewise, Kitchen states that “the Egyptians under Ramesses III maintained their overlordship over both the Canaanites and the newcomers...” ….
Weinstein was more positive. Stressing the scarcity of late 19th dynasty remains from Palestine … coincident with “Egypt’s domestic problems,” he clearly attributed a more active policy to Ramesses III than one of inheritance: “Ramesses III seems to have done his best to restore a measure of control in Palestine.” …. Likewise Redford: “... Ramesses III had been able, by dint of military activity, to reassert his authority over much of Palestine and perhaps parts of Syria as well...” …. So also Morkot:
Ramesses III certainly did emulate Ramesses II—but in no superficial way. Archaeology is now showing that Ramesses III did, in fact, manage to renew Egyptian control over parts of western Asia....
These writers appreciated the obvious: the “smoking” gun for Ramesses III is provided by the archaeological and inscriptional remains from both southern Palestine (e.g. Lachish) and the Jezreel Valley (notably Beth Shean and Megiddo).
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